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Abstract
Concern about the gender gap in employee
compensation is an important social and business
issue. Effective corporate social responsibility
requires fair treatment of all employees, regardless
of gender. Using a sample of firms that have been
noted for their ethical behavior, this study examines
whether ethical firms compensate female CEOs
comparably to male CEOs. Our sample of ethical
firms includes companies listed as one of the “100
Best
Corporate
Citizens”
by
Corporate
Responsibility (formerly Business Ethics) magazine
and with data available in Compustat, CRSP, and
ExecuComp for fiscal years 1998-2009.
We
hypothesize that ethical firms, relative to non-list
firms, close (or at least narrow) the gender gap in
CEO compensation. Our findings indicate that
female CEOs of ethical companies are not penalized
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for their gender (that is, they do not earn less than
their male counterparts).

INTRODUCTION
Ethical corporate citizenship, CEO compensation, gender,
and pairwise associations between these variables have been
empirically explored by academics from many fields of study. Yet,
there is a dearth of research that examines all three variables
simultaneously. This study seeks to merge these three streams of
literature, fill this void in prior research, and answer our research
question: Does the gender gap in CEO compensation observed in
the broad population of firms narrow or close among a subset of
ethical companies? We operationally define “ethical” as inclusion
on Corporate Responsibility (formerly entitled Business Ethics)
magazine’s “100 Best Corporate Citizens” list.1
Ignoring CEO gender, two rationales (the risk argument and
agency theory) exist to explain an association between ethical
corporate citizenship and CEO compensation; however, their
directional predictions differ. The risk argument predicts a
negative relation between ethics and CEO pay, both short- and
long-term. Consistent with the risk argument, agency theory
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Muñoz-Bullón 2010) expects a
negative relation between ethics and CEO short-term pay;
however, in contrast with the risk argument, agency theory predicts
a positive relation between ethics and CEO long-term
compensation.
The risk argument suggests ethical firms should pay their
executives less than comparable non-list firms. We derive this
expectation by merging two literature streams: ethics research,
which finds ethical firms are less risky than non-list firms
(Blazovich and Smith 2011), and executive compensation research,
We use the term “non-list” to identify firm-year observations that do not appear
on the list.
1
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which finds less risky companies pay their executives less (e.g.,
Core et al. 1999; Huang et al. 2011; Smith and Watts 1992). The
risk argument is consistent with the conflict-resolution hypothesis
of Cai et al. (2011); one motivation for this hypothesis is that
ethical companies experience fewer conflicts of interest between
top managers and stakeholders (such as stockholders and
employees), resulting in less firm risk than other companies and,
accordingly, lower executive compensation.
While the risk argument predicts a negative relation
between ethical status and CEO compensation, agency theory
refines the risk argument and offers unique predictions for various
compensation elements. To minimize the principal-agent conflict,
agency theory proposes compensation should be performancebased (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Muñoz-Bullón 2010).
Companies reward short-term performance (e.g., achieving a sales
or earnings target) with annual bonuses and long-term performance
(e.g., steadily increasing stock price) with long-term incentive plan
payments, stock grants, and option grants. Accordingly, agency
theory holds that annual bonuses encourage the attainment of shortrun goals while long-term incentive plan payments and stock-based
compensation align executives’ decisions with the long-run
business strategy and preservation/growth of long-run firm value.
Prior research demonstrates ethical corporate citizenship is
associated with better performance (e.g., Roman et al. 1999;
Waddock and Graves 1997), and creating an ethical corporate
culture is a long-term process and commitment (Mahoney and
Thorne 2006); therefore, agency theory suggests that long-term
compensation should be positively associated with ethical
corporate citizenship. Our predictions, which we base on agency
theory, are consistent with the predictions and findings of Mahoney
and Thorne (2006). In our study, we explore the relation between
ethical corporate citizenship and CEO compensation to provide
evidence on which rationale, agency theory or the risk argument,
best explains this relation.
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In addition to providing a possible explanation for the
relation between ethics and compensation, agency theory implies
gender should not influence pay. Despite this implication,
numerous studies find a gender pay gap exists, even at the
executive level (Bertrand and Hallock 2001; Elkinawy and Stater
2011; and Muñoz-Bullón 2010). Prior studies suggest that the
gender pay gap may not be attributable to gender but rather to
human capital differences (Bertrand and Hallock 2001; Blau and
Kahn 1997), which are often correlated with gender but are
typically not incorporated into empirical studies. Examples of
human capital measures include education, experience, leadership
ability, and reputation (Gray and Benson 2003; Muñoz-Bullón
2010). Any pay gap not explained by differences in human capital
is considered the gender difference, and this residual pay gap has
been explained in prior studies by Becker’s “taste for
discrimination” theory (Becker 1971; Bertrand and Hallock 2001;
Elkinawy and Stater 2011). This theory suggests employers who
have a distaste for female workers pay them less than comparable
male workers. In our study, we explore the relation between
gender and CEO compensation, after controlling for differences in
human capital, to confirm a gender pay gap exists in our sample as
in prior studies.
In addition to academic interest in the gender pay gap,
several non-profit groups (e.g., the American Association of
University Women, the Institute for Women’s Policy Research,
and the National Committee on Pay Equity) focus their efforts on
increasing awareness of and reducing the gender compensation
difference. Ensuring fair treatment of employees, regardless of
gender, is a laudable social and business goal, and consistent with
stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984; Maxfield 2007), which
contends that firms should be concerned with multiple stakeholders
– including employees. At the April 2012 White House Forum on
Women and the Economy, President Obama had this to say about
the gender compensation gap:

Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 15, No. 2 (2014)

261

When any of our citizens can’t fulfill the potential
that they have because of factors that have nothing
to do with talent, or character, or work ethic, that
diminishes us all. It holds all of us back… Closing
this pay gap -- ending pay discrimination -- is about
far more than simple fairness.
Academic research can address the extent to which the goal
of equitable employee treatment is met (or progress toward this
goal is made). A number of studies (e.g., Bernardi et al. 2009;
Bowlin and Renner 2008; Grosser 2009; Muñoz-Bullón 2010; Ngo
et al. 2003) suggest that one aspect of corporate social
responsibility is fair treatment of minorities, including women, and
equitable compensation (i.e., equal pay for equal work) is one
aspect of treating female employees fairly. Accordingly, for firms
that have been identified as ethical, an expectation exists that these
firms, relative to other non-list firms, are more proactive at
reducing the gender pay gap. This study addresses whether the
gender gap in CEO compensation closes or at least narrows for
ethical companies, relative to other companies.
Gender differences matter to women of all generations.
Sandra Fluke, a 2012 law school graduate who will soon enter the
legal profession, had this to say about today’s female graduates and
their expectations on gender pay equality: 2
As a graduating student surrounded by classmates
about to assume their first jobs, I assure….[you]
that none of my female classmates is thinking,
‘Salary isn't that important to me. I don't plan to
work hard and don't need to be paid fairly, because
2 Ms. Fluke made headlines recently in U.S. political news as an advocate for
female healthcare options. We obtained Sandra Fluke’s quote from
http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/17/opinion/fluke-equal-pay-for-women/index.html.
Fluke’s comment was in response to a statement by Wisconsin state Senator
Glenn Grothman, who asserted that “money is more important for men. I think a
guy in their first job, maybe because they expect to be a breadwinner someday,
may be a little more money conscious.”
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I won't be a breadwinner. A man will come along
to take care of that for me.’
Equal pay activist Lilly Ledbetter, for whom the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009 is named,3 summarizes the effects the gender
pay gap has had on her life:
The consequences of unequal pay reach far beyond
the paychecks women take home every week. My
pension and Social Security were based on an
unfair salary, so over the course of my career, I was
cheated out of hundreds of thousands of dollars that
could have gone to my kids’ education or my
family’s medical bills or to support the shops and
small businesses in my community. I also worked
countless hours of overtime, but the extra pay I
earned was based on the same uneven scale.
Gender differences in CEO compensation between ethical and
other companies may influence a woman’s decision of where to
begin or continue her employment; stated differently, a woman
may be more inclined to seek employment in an ethical firm, where
a commitment to gender parity includes “equal pay for equal
work.”
To test our hypotheses, we use OLS regression, with
clustering on individual CEO, to examine the associations between
CEO compensation (in total, and components: salary, bonus,
option grants, stock grants, and long-term incentive plan payments)
and (a) an ethical company indicator variable, (b) a female CEO
indicator variable, and (c) the interaction of these two variables.
Consistent with agency theory and prior research (e.g., Mahoney
and Thorne 2005, 2006), our regression results indicate CEO salary
(one of our two short-term compensation measures) is lower for
ethical companies, while stock grants and long-term incentive plan
3 We obtained Lilly Ledbetter’s quote from
http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/24/opinion/ledbetter-equalpay/index.html?hpt=hp_c2.
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payments (two of our three long-term compensation measures) are
higher for ethical companies. Consistent with the “taste for
discrimination” argument (Becker 1971) and prior empirical
studies (Bertrand and Hallock 2001; Elkinawy and Stater 2011;
and Muñoz-Bullón 2010), our regression results indicate that
female CEOs are paid less total compensation, short-term
compensation, stock grants, and long-term incentive plan payments
than male CEOs, controlling for human capital differences. We
find no gender difference associated with the value of option grants
to CEOs.
To test whether the gender disparity for CEO compensation
narrows for ethical companies, we sum our estimated regression
coefficients. For five of six compensation variables, our results
show that the coefficient on the female main effect is negative and
significant, indicating that female CEOs earn less than their male
counterparts. However, for all of these five compensation
variables, the sum of the coefficients on the female main effect and
the interaction of female and ethical does not differ significantly
from zero, indicating that female CEOs of ethical companies are
not penalized for their gender (that is, they do not earn less than
their male counterparts). In answer to our research question – yes,
among the CEOs in our sample, when a gender gap does exist (i.e.,
for total compensation, salary, bonus, stock grants, and long-term
incentive plan payments), ethical firms do narrow the gender pay
gap.
The paper proceeds as follows.
The next section
summarizes prior literature and develops our hypotheses. Then we
describe our sample selection, present our empirical methods, and
discuss our results. The final section concludes.
PRIOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF
HYPOTHESES
In the broadest sense, this is an ethics study, examining
whether businesses identified as ethical provide equitable CEO
compensation regardless of gender. While this study falls under
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the overarching canopy of ethics, it also falls under two other
academic umbrellas, being both a study of CEO compensation and
a gender study. Recently, two streams of research have emerged
and evolved. One focuses on the relation between ethical
corporate citizenship and executive compensation, while the other
examines the association between gender and executive
compensation. Accordingly, we provide a brief review of the
representative ethics and CEO compensation research as well as
the gender and CEO compensation research. In conjunction with
our review of prior literature, we present our hypotheses.
Ethics and CEO Compensation
Recent studies have examined the association between
CEO compensation and ethical corporate citizenship and found
mixed results (Cai et al. 2011; Callan and Thomas 2011; Mahoney
and Thorne 2005, 2006). Using a large sample of U.S. firms from
1996 to 2010, Cai et al. (2011) find CEOs at ethical firms earn less
compensation than CEOs at similar non-list firms. They argue this
result is consistent with their conflict-resolution hypothesis, which
they derive from stakeholder theory. This explanation contends
that managers at ethical firms proactively consider the interests of
all stakeholders, not just shareholders; as a result, fewer conflicts
arise between managers and various stakeholder groups. Fewer
conflicts result in lower firm risk and thus lower manager
compensation.4 Cai et al.’s (2011) conflict-resolution hypothesis is
consistent with our risk argument. The risk argument holds that
ethical firms are less risky than non-list firms (Blazovich and

4

One criticism of stakeholder theory is that it does not prescribe an algorithm
for trading off the competing stakeholders’ interests. However, proactively
considering multiple stakeholders’ interests (e.g., giving charitably, offering
employee benefits, protecting the environment, etc.) rather than focusing
exclusively on the wishes of shareholders (i.e., increasing stock price) should
reduce the number of conflicts arising between managers and non-owner
stakeholders.
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Smith, 2011), and less risky companies pay their executives less
(e.g., Core et al. 1999; Huang et al. 2011; Smith and Watts 1992).
Callan and Thomas (2011) simultaneously examine
executive compensation, corporate social responsibility, and firm
financial performance and find differing results from Cai et al.
(2011); using a sample of large U.S. firms from years 2003 to
2005, Callan and Thomas (2011) find that CEO compensation is
positively related to corporate social responsibility. Using a small
sample of publicly traded Canadian companies, Mahoney and
Thorne (2005, 2006) find both a positive and a negative association
between compensation and ethics; they find a positive relation
between long-term compensation and ethical corporate citizenship,
consistent with their hypothesis that long-term compensation
focuses executives’ attention on long-run initiatives, of which
corporate social responsibility is one. However, they find a
negative relation between short-term compensation and ethical
corporate citizenship. Mahoney and Thorne (2006) explain this
result by arguing that short-term compensation may focus top
managers’ attention on sales or earnings targets and result in less
attention paid to other stakeholders’ interests (the focus of ethical
corporate responsibility). For example, a CEO who receives a
bonus if the firm’s earnings per share reach or exceed the
consensus analyst forecast may dedicate time to managing earnings
rather than improving relations with community organizations,
unions, and regulators.
Mahoney and Thorne’s (2006) hypothesis regarding longterm compensation is consistent with agency theory, which
encourages companies to use performance-based compensation as
a means to promote a desired behavior (Jensen and Meckling 1976;
Minnick and Noga 2010; Muñoz-Bullón 2010). Long-term
compensation, such as long-term incentive plan payments, stock
grants, and option grants, links CEO incentives with the long-run
strategy and long-run performance of the company. Also, creating
an ethical corporate culture takes time and requires a long-term
commitment. Accordingly, agency theory holds that long-term
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compensation should be positively associated with ethical
corporate citizenship.
To distinguish between the risk and agency theories, we
examine both short- and long-term measures of compensation,
consistent with Mahoney and Thorne (2006). Because building an
ethical corporate environment requires a long-term commitment,
we predict a positive relation between ethical corporate citizenship
and long-term CEO compensation. Short-term compensation is
less likely to motivate long-term initiatives, such as developing an
ethical corporate culture, so we predict a negative relation between
ethical corporate citizenship and short-term CEO compensation.
Total CEO compensation has both short- and long-term
components; therefore, we make no directional prediction on the
association between ethical corporate citizenship and total CEO
compensation.
Several executive compensation studies (e.g., Bertrand and
Hallock 2001; Muñoz-Bullón 2010; Smith et al. 2011) find the title
of the executive is associated with the amount of compensation.
ExecuComp, our compensation data source, contains compensation
data for the five highest paid executives at each firm. The
positions occupied by these executives vary across firms, so
compensation may vary with the duties and responsibilities of these
positions. Accordingly, we exclusively examine CEOs, the most
homogenous executive position and the one that is consistently
included in ExecuComp for all firms covered by the database
(Bugeja et al. 2011). Limiting our study to CEOs is consistent with
Mahoney and Thorne (2006). We state our first set of hypotheses
as follows:
H1a: A negative association exists between ethical
corporate citizenship and short-term CEO compensation.
H1b:
A positive association exists between ethical
corporate citizenship and long-term CEO compensation.
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Gender and CEO Compensation
Regarding gender and CEO pay, a recent book
(Zweigenhaft et al. 2011) examined underrepresented groups
(women, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans) at
Fortune 500 Companies. By January 2011, there had been 74
Fortune 500 CEOs from underrepresented groups, specifically 24
white women, 15 African Americans, 15 Latino men, and 20 Asian
Americans. Almost all of these CEOs were appointed during 1999
to 2010. These appointments were a major change from prior
decades when virtually all CEOs were white males (Zweigenhaft et
al. 2011). Paul and Sahni (2009) find that, after matching male and
female executives based on size and industry, the gender pay gap
decreases with increases in job risk.
According to Bell (2005), cash compensation to female top
managers was 8 percent less than that to male top managers, while
total compensation was 25 percent less than that to male top
managers, after controlling for company size, occupational title,
and industry. Using ExecuComp data for years 1992 to 1997,
Bertrand and Hallock (2001) find that an unexplained gender gap
in executive compensation still exists. Muñoz-Bullón (2010)
complements prior research by examining a longer time period and
a measure of variable pay (i.e., differences in the value of exercised
stock options), finding that 90 percent of the gender compensation
gap relates to differences in variable pay. Elkinawy and Stater
(2011) confirm a gender pay gap and propose that it can be
explained by the “taste for discrimination” model (Becker 1971).
This model suggests that, if employers have a distaste for workers
from a particular group (e.g., women), they will pay them less than
comparable workers from the preferred group (e.g., men).
There is still some debate regarding whether and to what
extent there is a gender pay gap. Using ExecuComp data from
1992 to 2004, Adams et al. (2007) find no difference between
female and male CEO compensation; however, these authors fail to
control for known determinants of CEO compensation, including
size and profitability. Bowlin and Renner (2007) find no
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difference in compensation due to gender for top executives,
excluding the CEO, at mid- and small-cap firms.
Agency theory suggests that compensation should be
performance-based and thus unrelated to gender (Jensen and
Meckling 1976; Muñoz-Bullón 2010).
Fair treatment of
employees (i.e., equal pay for equal work) is also consistent with
stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984; Maxfield 2007), which argues
that firms should be concerned with many stakeholders – including
employees. It is possible the pay gap attributed to gender may
actually be due to an omitted correlated variable such as human
capital. Education, experience, leadership ability, and reputation
are human capital characteristics which are typically correlated
with gender (Gray and Benson 2003; Muñoz-Bullón 2010). We
control for differences in human capital by including CEO tenure, a
proxy used in the literature (Muñoz-Bullón 2010), in our model.
Concern regarding gender discrimination in executive
compensation is not limited to the United States. Chen and Wang
(2010), using data from 4,485 large firms in Taiwan, empirically
evaluate glass ceiling effects, analyze whether females face
discrimination during the promotion process, and find that board
chairpersons tend to select CEOs of the same gender. A study of
top corporate jobs in Denmark estimates a gender compensation
gap, after controlling for various characteristics (including marital
status and existence of a young child), of 30 percent (Smith et al.
2011). Foster et al. (2011) employ surveys of Canadian Certified
Management Accountants (CMAs) in 2007 and 2009 to examine
career-related issues regarding male and female accounting
professionals working in industry (rather than public accounting);
results suggest that compensation gaps due to gender seem to be
diminishing at the top management level.
To summarize, extant research generally finds female
executives earn less than male executives (e.g., Bell 2005; Bertrand
and Hallock 2001; Muñoz-Bullón 2010; Smith et al. 2011);
however, some research identifies no difference in executive
compensation due to gender (Adams et al. 2007; Bowlin and
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Renner 2008). It appears the influence of gender on CEO
compensation has not been definitively addressed in the literature.
We contribute to the literature by testing for gender differences in
CEO compensation using a large sample of publicly traded U.S.
companies and including a thorough set of control variables in our
regression models to capture alternative explanations of CEO pay
(e.g., firm size, firm risk, CEO human capital, etc.). Consistent
with the preponderance of evidence from prior studies, we state our
second hypothesis as follows:
H2: A negative association exists between gender (i.e.,
female) and CEO compensation.
Ethics, Gender, and CEO Compensation
As the preceding paragraphs demonstrate, academicians
from many fields have examined ethical corporate citizenship,
gender, CEO compensation, and pairwise associations between
these variables. Yet, we are aware of no prior study that examines
all three variables simultaneously. Theory, practice, and academic
research suggest there should be a positive relation between ethical
corporate citizenship and fair compensation of women.
Stakeholder theory provides one explanation for the link between
company ethics and gender pay equality (Freeman 1984; Maxfield
2007). Stakeholder theory contends that firms are concerned about
many stakeholders – including employees and the community. The
community has a general expectation that companies should treat
their employees fairly (GlobeSun 2006, as reported in Maxfield
2007). In practice, the fair treatment of women is considered by
ethical mutual fund managers and other responsible institutional
investors (Brooks 1997). Academic researchers have asserted that
gender inequity is unethical and violates the principle of equal
treatment (Ngo et al. 2003) and as such, companies have a moral
obligation to strive for gender equality (Thompson 2008). Several
studies state that gender equity is an important component of a
company’s corporate social responsibility (Bowlin and Renner
2008; Grosser 2009; Grosser and Moon 2005a, 2005b). We extend
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prior research and empirically test whether companies noted for
their high ethical standing treat employees fairly, regardless of
gender. Our third hypothesis is as follows:
H3: Ethical corporate citizenship reduces the effect of
gender on CEO compensation.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND EMPIRICAL METHOD
Data
Our data sources are ExecuComp, Compustat, CRSP, and
Corporate Responsibility (formerly entitled Business Ethics)
magazine’s “100 Best Corporate Citizens.” We obtain our
dependent variable, CEO compensation, and two of our control
variables from ExecuComp.
Compustat provides financialstatement data and CRSP provides stock return data, which we use
to construct additional control variables. Being identified as one of
Corporate Responsibility magazine’s “100 Best Corporate
Citizens” serves as our proxy for ethical behavior. While the
precise methodology used to create this list is proprietary, the
magazine does disclose relevant details that support the construct
validity of this measure. For example, in 2012, the magazine
evaluated all firms in the Russell 1000 Index (indicating broad
eligibility for inclusion on the list) and considered 318 “data
elements” in seven categories (climate change abatement,
corporate governance, employee relations, environmental impact,
financial performance, human rights, and philanthropy).5 The
magazine collects its data from publicly available sources (e.g.,
company websites, CSR reports, audited financial statements, etc.)
and allows companies to review the accuracy of their data and
correct factual errors before finalizing the list. Several studies
(e.g., Blazovich and Smith 2011; Brammer at el. 2009; Fafatas and
Of the 318 data elements, seven (2 percent) include the word “female” or
“gender.” Thus, we contend that our Ethical variable captures the broad
construct of ethical corporate citizenship, not simply the narrow construct of
gender equity.
5
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Hoover 2012; Filbeck et al. 2009; Laksmana and Yang 2009)
provide precedence for using inclusion on this list as a proxy for
ethical corporate citizenship.
The final sample we use for analysis includes all firms with
data available in ExecuComp, Compustat, and CRSP for fiscal
years 1998-2009. Our full sample contains 13,477 CEO-year
observations consisting of 2,471 unique CEOs. Of the 13,477
CEO-year observations, 739 are associated with 278 unique ethical
firms. Our initial sample included 12 years of the “100 Best
Corporate Citizens.” Some attrition occurred due to mergers,
acquisitions, and delistings; however, most attrition occurred
because data was not available in ExecuComp.
Lack of
ExecuComp data was common for our early list years (e.g., for
year 2009, our final sample includes 96 ethical firms, whereas for
year 1999, our final sample includes only 36 ethical firms).
Dependent Variables
Consistent with Mahoney and Thorne (2006), we examine
total, short-term, and long-term measures of CEO compensation.
For CEO total compensation, we use ExecuComp data item
TDC1.6 Our short-term compensation measures are SALARY and
BONUS. Our long-term compensation measures are the value of
options granted, the value of stock granted, and the amount paid
under a long-term incentive plan. Due to an accounting standard
change in the reporting of stock compensation, ExecuComp data
changed during our sample period; as a result, the data items we
use for long-term compensation vary by year. For Option Grants,
pre-2006,
we
use
the
ExecuComp
data
item
OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE;
post-2005,
we
use
6

Pre-2006 TDC1 includes salary, bonus, other annual, total value of restricted
stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), longterm incentive payouts, and all other total. Post-2005, TDC1 includes salary,
bonus, non-equity incentive plan compensation, grant-date fair value of option
awards, grant-date fair value of stock awards, deferred compensation earnings
reported as compensation, and other compensation.
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OPTION_AWARDS_FV. For Stock Grants, pre-2006, we use
RSTKGRNT; post-2005, we use STOCK_AWARDS_FV. For
Long-term Incentives, pre-2006, we use LTIP; post-2005, we use
NONEQ_INCENT.
Following prior research, we use the natural logarithm of
our compensation variables (Adams et al. 2007; Elkinawy and
Stater 2011; Huang et al. 2011; Muñoz-Bullón, 2010) to minimize
the influence of outliers and create a dataset which approximates a
normal distribution. Empirical specification tests and economic
theory suggest that the natural logarithm of compensation is more
appropriate for regression analysis than compensation in actual
dollars (Heckman and Polachek 1974). For each compensation
component (e.g., total compensation, salary, bonus, etc.), we
examine the level of compensation only for firms that utilize that
particular component. Because most sample firms do not utilize all
components of compensation, our sample size varies across
compensation component.7 The dependent variable definitions are
summarized in Table 1, Panel A.
Independent Variables of Interest
Our variables of interest are Ethical, Female_CEO, and the
interaction of the two. Ethical is coded 1 if the company is
identified as ethical, 0 otherwise. Following Blazovich and Smith
(2011), a firm in our sample is identified as ethical in year t-2 if it
is listed as one of the “100 Best Corporate Citizens” by Corporate
Responsibility (formerly Business Ethics) magazine in year t.
Because Corporate Responsibility publishes its list early in the
year, the data used to compile the list is taken from the financial
statements available during the prior year. For example, the 2010
list is compiled during 2009 using the most current data available
at that time, typically from fiscal year 2008.
7

If we retain only firms that utilize all compensation components, our sample
contains just 703 CEO-year observations, only 59 of which are Ethical=1. The
inferences drawn from such a small sample are unreliable and lack
generalizability.
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ExecuComp provides CEO gender. Female_CEO is coded
1 if the CEO is a woman, 0 if the CEO is a man. Additionally, we
incorporate the interaction of Ethical and Female_CEO in our
model. The interaction of the two indicator variables is coded 1 if
the CEO is a woman (Female_CEO=1) and the company is

TABLE 1
Variable Definitions
We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.

Panel A - Dependent Variables - Compensation
Total Compensation
= Log (TDC1 from Execucomp)
Salary
= Log (SALARY from Execucomp)
Bonus
= Log (BONUS from Execucomp)
Stock Options
= fiscal years 1998 - 2005, Log (OPTION_AWARD_BLK_VALUE from Execucomp)
fiscal years 2006 - 2009, Log (FAIR_VALUE from Execucomp)
Panel B - Independent Variables
Ethical

For fiscal years 1998-2005, indicator variable = 1 if firm is on the Business Ethics magazine 100
= Best Corporate Citizens list for the year t + 2 , 0 otherwise
For fiscal years 2006-2009, indicator variable = 1 if firm is on the Corporate Responsibility
magazine 100 Best Corporate Citizens list for the year t + 2 , 0 otherwise
Corporate Responsibility is the new name for Business Ethics magainze
List year - 2 years = data year (e.g. inclusion on list in year 2005 is matched to 2003 financial data)

Female_CEO

= indicator variable = 1 if CEO is female for that year, 0 otherwise; data available from Execucomp
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Variable Definitions
Panel C - Control Variables
ROA
Market_return
Leverage
Market -to-book
Firm_age
Firm_size
CEO_tenure
Year
Industry

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

NI / ((AT + Lag(AT))/2), all three variables from Compustat
Total monthly returns - total value weighted returns, accumulated by year; both variables from CRSP
((LT - LCT) / AT), all three variables from Compustat
(PRCC_F × CSHO)/(AT-LT), all four variables from Compustat
number of years firm has been listed in Compustat
Log (AT from Compustat)
number of years executive has been a CEO, computed using Execucomp data
indicator variable = 1 if observation is from that year, and 0 otherwise
indicator variable = 1 if firm is in two-digit SIC code, and 0 otherwise

recognized as ethical for that year (Ethical=1), 0 otherwise. See
Table 1, Panel B for a summary of independent variable
definitions.
Control Variables
Prior studies show that CEO compensation is positively
associated with firm size and firm performance (e.g., Bertrand and
Hallock 2001; Huang et al. 2011; Muñoz-Bullón 2010). The
argument is that larger companies are more complex and therefore
require higher quality, and thus higher paid, managers. We include
the natural logarithm of total assets (Firm_size) in our model to
control for firm size. To control for firm performance, we include
both return on assets (ROA) and market-adjusted returns (Return)
in our model.
We compute ROA using accounting data,
specifically net income divided by average total assets. We
measure Return by annually accumulating monthly raw returns less
value-weighted market returns.
Consistent with prior research (Huang et al. 2011; Nichols
and Subramaniam 2001), we control for company growth
opportunities by including both market-to-book ratio (MTB) and
firm age (Firm_age). We calculate MTB as fiscal-yearend
common stock price multiplied by number of common shares
outstanding, divided by book value of stockholders’ equity at
yearend. Firm_age is the number of years a firm has been listed in
Compustat.
Prior research has found an association between CEO
compensation and firm risk (Core et al. 1999; Huang et al. 2011;
Smith and Watts 1992); therefore, we include leverage as a control
variable in our model. We compute Leverage as long-term
liabilities divided by total assets.8

8

We also conduct all analyses using cash-flow volatility as an alternative proxy
for risk, and our results are robust to this change. Consistent with prior research
(Albrecht and Richardson 1990; Michelson et al. 1995; Minton and Schrand
1999), we define cash-flow volatility as the coefficient of variation in a firm’s
operating cash flows over the six-year period preceding the sample year,
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Prior studies have found a relation between CEOs’ human
capital (e.g., their expertise, experience, education, and leadership
ability) and their compensation.9 Since data on an individual
CEO’s experience, education, expertise, etc. are not available in
ExecuComp, we proxy for a CEO’s human capital using CEO
tenure, consistent with Muñoz-Bullón (2010).
CEO_tenure
captures the experience and expertise aspects of a CEO’s human
capital.10

computed as the standard deviation scaled by the absolute value of the mean. A
firm is included in the sample if it has at least four non-missing years.
9

Farrell (2005) contends that the gender pay gap exists, not because women face
compensation discrimination, but because men and women make different
“lifestyle choices,” such as the number of hours worked, willingness to accept
risky jobs/hazardous assignments, willingness to change job locations, etc. While
these “lifestyle choices” clearly do influence the gender pay gap in general, we
do not believe that these “lifestyle choices” affect the specific gender pay gap
that we examine (i.e., between men and women who have reached the upper
echelon in corporate employment: CEOs). Moreover, in our multivariate models,
we control for firm risk and CEO human capital, variables that likely capture the
effects of “lifestyle choices” on the gender gap in CEO compensation.
10 Numerous studies provide evidence that mothers earn less than childless
women (e.g., Waldfogel 1998, Kalist 2008, Glass 2004, Correll et al. 2007, and
Lundberg and Rose 2000). This finding is referred to as the “motherhood wage
penalty.” Gough and Noonan (2013) provide an excellent review of the literature
examining the “motherhood wage penalty” in the U.S. To our knowledge, no
studies in this literature examine whether a “motherhood wage penalty” exists for
female CEOs, but two papers are particularly relevant to our setting. First,
Anderson et al. (2002) suggest that highly educated women (which female CEOs
unquestionably are) are likely to hold jobs with autonomy, and this autonomy
allows them to integrate work and family while maintaining a high level of work
commitment and productivity. In addition, highly educated women typically
have higher incomes such that they can afford childcare and thus mitigate workfamily conflicts. Second, Budig and Hodges (2010) actually find a motherhood
bonus for women in the top 10 percent of the earnings distribution (where female
CEOs unquestionably reside). Thus, while we are unable to control for
motherhood in our empirical models due to a lack of data availability, we feel
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Finally, to control for differences in CEO compensation
that may arise due to macroeconomic factors and industry
variation, we incorporate year and industry fixed effects. We use
2-digit SIC codes for industry. Table 1, Panel C provides a
summary of the control variable definitions.
Empirical Model
For each of our six compensation measures (total
compensation, salary, bonus, option grants, stock grants, and longterm incentive plan payments) we estimate the following equation:
CEO Compensation Measurei,t =  + β1 Ethicali,t +
β2 Female_CEOi,t + β3 Ethicali,t × Female_CEOi,t + β4 ROAi,t +
β5 Returni,t + β6 MTBi,t + β7 Leveragei,t + Β8 Firm_agei,t +
β9 Firm_sizei,t + β10 CEO_tenurei,t + Yeart + Industryi + i,t
(1)
In model (1), i denotes firm, and t denotes year. Because we
include the same CEO multiple times (i.e., multiple years) in our
dataset, the error term is not independent across time. We correct
for this effect and heteroskedasticity by clustering on CEO.11 To
eliminate the influence of outliers, we winsorize all continuous
variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Tables 2 through 5 present descriptive statistics. Table 2
groups firms according to the number of sample years they were
recognized as ethical. Table 3 shows mean and median
comparisons of all dependent and independent variables by ethical
confident that motherhood does not influence the results of our empirical
analyses.
11

Clustering does not affect coefficient estimates; rather, it adjusts standard
errors to reflect the presence of multiple observations on the same CEO and
reduces the likelihood of Type I error.
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status. Table 4 reports the same descriptive statistics by CEO
gender. Table 5 presents mean and median comparisons of all
variables by gender within ethical status.
Our full sample consists of 739 ethical firm-years related to
278 unique ethical firms, and 12,738 non-list firm-years related to
2,455 unique non-list firms. Table 2 partitions our sample
according to the number of years firms are recognized as ethical
during our sample period. Ninety-four firms are recognized only
once during our sample period. The majority of the firms, 93.2%,
are identified as ethical in five or fewer years. Just three firms
have been recognized as ethical in every sample period year.
TABLE 2
Number of sample years firms recognized as ethical

Number of
sample years
recognized
as ethical
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Number of
unique firms

Percentage of
unique firms

94
73
48
29
15
5
3
2
1
3
2
3

33.8%
26.3%
17.3%
10.4%
5.4%
1.8%
1.1%
0.7%
0.4%
1.1%
0.7%
1.1%

278

100.0%
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Descriptive statistics by ethical status are presented in
Table 3. Two-tailed t-test (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum test) results find
that mean (median) CEO compensation at ethical firms is
statistically greater than that at non-list firms, indicating that CEOs
at ethical firms are paid more than CEOs at non-list firms. This
result is consistent across all forms of compensation measured –
total compensation, salary, bonus, option grants, stock grants, and
long-term incentive plan payments. Further, the data suggest that
this pay difference is not due to differences in CEO human capital
because tenure, our proxy for human capital, is higher for CEOs at
non-list firms. Although the majority of CEOs are men, ethical
firms are significantly more likely to be female-led; 6 percent of
ethical firm-year observations report female CEOs relative to 3
percent of non-list firm-years. Univariate analysis of our control
variables (specifically, ROA, Return, and Firm_size), indicates that
ethical firms are larger and more profitable than non-list firms.
These differences in size and profitability could explain why CEOs
at ethical firms receive higher compensation, underscoring the need
to control for these variables in multivariate, regression analyses.
The results indicate no significant risk difference between ethical
and non-list firms. The results are mixed with respect to growth
opportunities. The data demonstrate that, on average, ethical firms
have higher market-to-book ratios, which suggests that ethical
firms have more growth opportunities than non-list firms.
However, the data also indicate that ethical firms are significantly
older than non-list firms, which suggests that ethical firms have
fewer growth opportunities.
Our full sample consists of 399 female CEO observations
related to 77 unique female CEOs, and 13,078 male CEO
observations related to 2,394 unique male CEOs. Table 4 presents
univariate analyses by CEO gender. Two-tailed t-test (WilcoxonRank-Sum test) results demonstrate that for five of the six (all six)
compensation categories, the mean (median) compensation of
female CEOs is statistically lower than that of male CEOs,
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TABLE 3
Means and medians for ethical firms and all non-list firms in
the dataset, 1998-2009

indicating that females are paid less than males, even at the highest
executive level. It is possible this gender pay difference is due to
human capital differences; on average female CEOs have shorter
tenure, our proxy for human capital, than their male counterparts.
Our findings demonstrate that female-led companies are smaller
than male-led companies. There is no statistical difference in ROA
between female- and male-led companies, indicating that CEO
gender does not influence accounting profitability. The results do
however show that the median Return for female-led companies is
statistically lower than that of male-led companies, indicating that
CEO gender does influence shareholders’ expectations of future
profitability. Our analysis indicates Leverage is lower for female-
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led companies, suggesting that female-led companies are less risky
than male-led companies. This result could indicate a selection
bias (i.e., female CEOs choose to manage less risky firms) or that
female CEOs take fewer risks than their male counterparts,
reducing their companies’ relative appetites for risk. Either way,
this difference underscores the importance of including Leverage
(as a proxy for risk) in our multivariate regression models to
control for this correlated variable. We find no statistical
differences between male- and female-led companies with respect
to growth opportunities.
TABLE 4
Means and medians for firms with female and firms with male
CEOs, 1998-2009
N

Female CEO
Mean
Median

N

Male CEO
Mean

Median

Compensation Variables
Total Compensation
Salary
Bonus
Option Grants
Stock Grants
Long-term Incentives

399
399
211
239
195
152

3115.30
578.51
464.99
1701.25
1852.59
1020.14

*
*
*
*

Variables of Interest
Ethical

399

0.10 *

Control Variables
ROA
Return
MTB
Leverage
Firm_age
Firm_size
CEO_tenure

399
399
399
399
399
399
399

0.04
0.07
3.06
0.15 *
24.48
7.13 *
4.56 *

*

1776.00
517.00
258.80
965.76
750.30
563.96

*
*
*
*
*
*

13,078
13,078
7,745
8,688
5,513
4,741

4230.11
640.02
823.64
2292.74
2198.52
1266.16

2403.00
590.00
450.00
1118.00
1138.00
753.42

0.00 *

13,078

0.05

0.00

13,078
13,078
13,078
13,078
13,078
13,078
13,078

0.04
0.11
2.80
0.19
25.03
7.62
6.23

0.04
0.07
2.07
0.16
19.00
7.47
4.00

0.05
0.03
2.08
0.11
18.00
7.07
3.00

*
*
*
*

*Mean (median) for list firms is significantly different from mean (median) for non-list firms at p = 0.05 or better using a two-tailed t-test
(Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum test).
Compensation amounts are listed in thousands. For descriptive statistics, we repot compensation amounts in actual dollars, not the
the natural logarithm.
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As shown in Table 5, 41 (5.5 percent) of the 739 ethical
firm-years are female-led, whereas only 358 (2.8 percent) of the
12,738 non-list firm-years are female-led. At non-list companies,
female CEOs are paid less than male CEOs; this result is consistent
for all compensation categories examined. However, at ethical
companies, gender pay differences are much less pervasive. Only
the means of total compensation, bonuses, and option grants differ
by gender; there are no median compensation differences by gender
for any of the six compensation variables. These descriptive
statistics provide univariate support for our third hypothesis that
ethical corporate citizenship moderates the effect of gender on
CEO compensation.
Univariate analysis of our control variables indicates few
differences between female- and male-led ethical companies; they
are comparable in profitability, risk, and size. Only average firm
age differs between these two sub-samples. In comparison, there
are many differences between female- and male-led non-list
companies. Non-list female-led companies are smaller and less
risky than non-list male-led companies. Profitability data are
mixed. Accounting profitability does not differ between male- and
female-led non-list firms; however, median market returns for nonlist female-led companies are less than those of male-led
companies. Data on growth opportunities are also mixed. Non-list
female-led companies are younger than non-list male-led
companies, implying female-led companies have more growth
opportunities. However, market-to-book ratios do not differ by
gender, suggesting growth opportunities for non-list companies are
not influenced by CEO gender. Regarding CEO human capital, we
do find gender differences within non-list companies: on average,
female CEOs have less human capital (as measured by tenure) than
their male counterparts, underscoring the need to include this
variable as a control in multivariate models.

TABLE 5
Means and medians for firms with female and male CEOs, by ethical status, 1998-2009

Ethical firms

All non-list firms in dataset

N

Female CEO
Mean
Median

N

Compensation Variables
Total Compensation
Salary
Bonus
Option Grants
Stock Grants
Long-term Incentives

41
41
22
33
23
21

6590.79 * 6760.70
864.91
837.07
858.64 * 571.08
2708.46 * 1733.30
4566.95
4796.30
2029.42
1884.30

698
698
392
539
353
354

8644.57
859.69
1256.22
4281.62
4465.39
2407.24

6369.90
859.55
693.16
2479.90
3414.40
1932.00

358
358
189
206
172
131

2717.27
545.70
419.16
1539.90
1489.62
858.35

Control Variables
ROA
Return
MTB
Leverage
Firm_age
Firm_size
CEO_tenure

41
41
41
41
41
41
41

698
698
698
698
698
698
698

0.07
0.14
4.03
0.18
36.07
9.29
4.85

0.07
0.09
3.00
0.16
37.50
9.35
3.00

358
358
358
358
358
358
358

0.04
0.06
2.80
0.14
22.35
6.93
4.66

0.08
0.13
5.27
0.20
43.00 *
8.87
3.71

0.08
0.10
3.98
0.19
51.00 *
8.65
2.00

Male CEO
Mean
Median

N

Female CEO
Mean
Median
* 1615.00 *
* 500.00 *
* 248.27 *
* 828.30 *
* 685.84 *
* 477.76 *

*
*
*
*

0.05
0.03
1.96
0.09
17.00
6.84
3.00

*Mean (median) for list firms is significantly different from mean (median) for non-list firms at p = 0.05 or better using a two-tailed t-test (Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum test).
Compensation amounts are listed in thousands. For descriptive statistics, we repot compensation amounts in actual dollars, not the the natural logarithm.

N

*
*
*
*
*

Male CEO
Mean
Median

12,380
12,380
7,353
8,149
5,160
4,387

3981.22
627.63
800.58
2161.19
2043.44
1174.08

2305.00
575.00
442.00
1061.00
1056.00
704.70

12,380
12,380
12,380
12,380
12,380
12,380
12,380

0.04
0.11
2.73
0.19
24.41
7.53
6.31

0.04
0.07
2.02
0.16
19.00
7.39
4.00

Multivariate Regression Analysis
We use regression analysis to examine the difference in
CEO compensation due to ethical corporate citizenship and CEO
gender after controlling for other factors that affect CEO
compensation, specifically firm size, performance, risk, growth
opportunities, CEO tenure, year, and industry. Table 6 presents
regression results for the natural logarithm of CEO compensation.
We calculate p-values using standard errors that cluster by CEO to
correct for heteroskedasticity and the correlation among
observations for the same CEO. Consistent with Mahoney and
Thorne (2006), we estimate our model using both short- and longterm measures of compensation as the response variable; however,
unlike Mahoney and Thorne (2006), we examine three long-term
compensation measures – option grants, stock grants, and longterm incentive plan payments. We examine both short- and longterm compensation measures because prior research has found, and
thus we predict, the relation between compensation and our
variables of interest depends on compensation type. We report pvalues based on 2-tailed t-tests because we do not place directional
predictions on all explanatory variables.
Our first set of hypotheses (H1a and H1b) predicts a
relation between CEO compensation and ethical corporate
citizenship. Specifically, hypothesis 1a predicts a negative relation
between short-term compensation (Salary and Bonus) and ethical
corporate citizenship, and hypothesis 1b predicts a positive relation
between long-term compensation (Option Grants, Stock Grants,
and Long-term Incentives) and ethical corporate citizenship. Total
CEO compensation consists of both short- and long-term
compensation; therefore, we make no directional prediction on its
association with ethical corporate citizenship. Overall, our results
provide some support for our predictions.
After controlling for other factors known to affect CEO
compensation, we find salary, one of our two short-term CEO
compensation measures, is negatively associated with ethical
corporate citizenship. The relation between Salary and Ethical is

TABLE 6 - CEO Compensation, 1998-2009

CEO Compensation Measurei,t =  + β1 Ethicali,t + β2 Female_CEOi,t + β3 Ethicali,t × Female_CEOi,t + β4 ROAi,t + β5 Returni,t
+ β6 MTBi,t + β7 Leveragei,t + Β8 Firm_agei,t + β9 Firm_sizei,t + β10 CEO_tenurei,t + Yeart + Industryi + i,t
Panel A - Total Compensation and Short-term Compensation
Dependent variable:
Total Compensation

Independent variables:
Intercept
Ethical
Female_CEO
Ethical × Female_CEO
ROA
Return
MTB
Leverage
Firm_age
Firm_size
CEO_tenure
Year
Industry

N (observations) = 13,477
N (CEO clusters) = 2,471
Parameter
Prediction
Estimate
p-value
+/+/+
+
+
+
+/+
+
+/+/-

R2
Female_CEO + Ethical × Female_CEO

4.507
<0.0001
0.005
0.9126
-0.195
0.0132
0.142
0.4681
0.445
0.0004
0.095
<0.0001
0.044
<0.0001
-0.094
0.2765
-0.002
0.0364
0.436
<0.0001
0.011
0.0002
omitted
omitted
45.73%

n.s.

-0.053

Salary

Bonus

N (observations) = 13,477
N (CEO clusters) = 2,471
Parameter
Prediction
Estimate
p-value

N (observations) = 7,952
N (CEO clusters) = 1,938
Parameter
Prediction
Estimate
p-value

+/+
+/+/+/+/+/+
+
+/+/-

4.706
<0.0001
-0.053
0.0940
-0.135
0.0013
0.144
0.2051
-0.017
0.7791
-0.014
0.0686
0.003
0.1957
0.107
0.0422
0.003
<0.0001
0.171
<0.0001
0.012
<0.0001
omitted
omitted
47.98%

0.6681

0.009

We cluster by CEO to generate robust standard errors. We omit year and industry indicator variables for concision.
P-values are based on two-tailed significance tests.

+/+
+/+/+/+/+/+
+
+/+/-

3.591
<0.0001
-0.075
0.2929
-0.252
0.0378
0.264
0.2666
1.087
<0.0001
0.296
<0.0001
0.016
0.0076
0.078
0.5480
0.002
0.3185
0.408
<0.0001
0.024
<0.0001
omitted
omitted
37.38%

0.8879

0.012

0.9578
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TABLE 6 (continued) - CEO Compensation, 1998-2009
Panel B - Long-term Compensation
Dependent variable:
Option Grants

Independent variables:
Intercept
Ethical
Female_CEO
Ethical × Female_CEO
ROA
Return
MTB
Leverage
Firm_age
Firm_size
CEO_tenure
Year
Industry

N (observations) = 8,927
N (CEO clusters) = 2,042
Parameter
Prediction
Estimate
p-value
+/+
+
+/+/+/+/+/+
+
+/+/-

R2
Female_CEO + Ethical × Female_CEO

3.440
<0.0001
-0.065
0.3660
-0.186
0.1354
-0.032
0.9004
0.184
0.3416
-0.024
0.3673
0.091
<0.0001
-0.273
0.0417
-0.009
<0.0001
0.500
<0.0001
0.021
<0.0001
omitted
omitted
40.36%

n.s.

-0.218

Stock Grants

Long-term Incentives

N (observations) = 5,707
N (CEO clusters) = 1,701
Parameter
Prediction
Estimate
p-value

N (observations) = 4,892
N (CEO clusters) = 1,577
Parameter
Prediction
Estimate
p-value

+/+
+
+/+/+/+/+/+
+
+/+/-

2.469
<0.0001
0.182
0.0108
-0.223
0.0436
0.423
0.0787
0.257
0.2566
-0.044
0.2736
0.029
0.0010
-0.270
0.0770
-0.005
0.0035
0.496
<0.0001
0.012
0.0107
omitted
omitted
38.87%

0.2263

0.200

We cluster by CEO to generate robust standard errors. We omit year and industry indicator variables for concision.
P-values are based on two-tailed significance tests.

+/+
+
+/+/+/+/+/+
+
+/+/-

2.615
<0.0001
0.126
0.0372
-0.187
0.0607
-0.149
0.6563
2.016
<0.0001
0.352
<0.0001
0.021
0.0024
0.106
0.4391
0.001
0.5402
0.409
<0.0001
0.029
<0.0001
omitted
omitted
41.62%

0.4058

-0.336

0.1059

negative and marginally significant (p = 0.0940). The estimated
regression coefficient on the ethical indicator variable is
-0.053. Since our dependent variable is measured as the natural
logarithm of compensation, we cannot use this coefficient to
directly interpret the percentage difference in compensation
between ethical and non-list firms. Rather, we must first translate
the coefficient as follows: eβ. This translation yields the percentage
difference in compensation associated with the indicator variable,
in this case ethics (Mendenhall and Sincich, 2003: 379-386;
Muñoz-Bullón, 2010). This result implies that CEOs at ethical
companies earn 5.2 percent lower salaries than CEOs at non-list
companies. This result is consistent with both agency theory and
the research results of Mahoney and Thorne (2006). The relation
between Bonus and Ethical is in the correct direction (parameter
estimate = -0.075); however, this coefficient is not statistically
significant (p = 0.2929).
Consistent with agency theory and Mahoney and Thorne
(2006), we find a positive association between two of our three
long-term compensation measures and ethical corporate
citizenship. The relation between Stock Grants and Ethical is
positive and significant (p = 0.0108). This result implies that
CEOs at ethical companies receive 20.0 percent more stock-grant
compensation than do CEOs at non-list companies. The relation
between Long-term Incentives and Ethical is also positive and
significant (p = 0.0372), suggesting that CEOs at ethical companies
receive 13.4 percent larger long-term incentive plan payments than
do CEOs at other companies.
Consistent with extant research (e.g., Bertrand and Hallock
2001; Elkinawy and Stater, 2011; Muñoz-Bullón 2010), hypothesis
2 predicts a negative association between female CEO and
compensation (i.e., women are paid less than men). To test this
hypothesis, we examine the coefficient on Female_CEO. This
variable is coded 1 for female CEOs; therefore, a negative
coefficient indicates females are paid less than males. After
controlling for other factors known to influence CEO
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compensation, our results document a negative relation between
Female_CEO and total compensation, both of our short-term
measures of compensation, and two of our three long-term
measures of compensation. Because we include CEO_tenure in
our model, we consider the observed compensation difference
captured by the Female_CEO indicator variable to be attributable
to gender rather than differences in human capital. The relation
between Total Compensation and Female_CEO is negative and
significant (p = 0.0132). This coefficient suggests that the pay
disparity between male and female CEOs is 17.7 percent.
Similarly, the relations between our short-term compensation
measures (Salary and Bonus) and Female_CEO are negative and
significant. These results suggest that female CEOs receive
salaries that are 12.6 percent lower and bonuses that are 22.3
percent lower than their male counterparts. We also find a
negative relation between two of our three measures of long-term
compensation (Stock Grants and Long-term Incentives) and
Female_CEO. The data suggest that the value of stock granted to
female CEOs is 20.0 percent less than that granted to male CEOs.
The results also suggest that female CEOs are paid 17.1 percent
lower long-term incentive plan payments than comparable male
CEOs. We find no association between Option Grants and
Female_CEO, suggesting that female CEOs and male CEOs are
compensated comparably with stock options.
Our findings
provide evidence of a gender pay gap even at the highest executive
level for total compensation as well as most of its components.
Our results are consistent with prior research (Bertrand and
Hallock 2001; Elkinawy and Stater 2011) and Becker’s “taste for
discrimination” argument. Overall, our results provide support for
hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that ethical corporate citizenship
moderates the effect of CEO gender on CEO compensation. We
sum the estimated regression coefficients to test whether the
gender disparity in CEO compensation narrows or closes for
ethical companies. Specifically, using t-tests, we compare the sum
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of the coefficients on Female_CEO and Ethical×Female_CEO to
zero. With a t-test, the null (alternative) hypothesis states that the
sum of the coefficients is equal (not equal) to zero. Failure to
reject the null hypothesis would support our prediction for
hypothesis 3.
For the five compensation measures where a gender pay
gap was identified (total compensation, salary, bonus, stock grants,
and long-term incentive plan payments), we fail to reject the null
hypotheses that the sums of the coefficients on Female_CEO and
Ethical×Female_CEO are significantly different from zero.
Accordingly, these results provide evidence that, when a gender
gap in CEO compensation exists, that gap closes for ethical
companies. It appears ethical firms are gender blind with respect
to CEO compensation. The data support our third hypothesis.
CONCLUSION
We empirically investigate whether ethical firms minimize
the gender gap in CEO compensation. Using a sample of
companies that have been noted for their high ethical standing, this
study examines whether ethical firms compensate female CEOs
and male CEOs comparably. We explore the relations between
various measures of CEO compensation and ethical corporate
citizenship, CEO gender, and the interaction of the two. We select
our sample of ethical companies from firms identified among the
“100 Best Corporate Citizens” by Corporate Responsibility
(formerly Business Ethics) magazine and for which data is
available in Compustat, CRSP, and ExecuComp for fiscal years
1998-2009.
Our study is not without limitations. We use a sample of
large, publically traded U.S. firms. Accordingly, our results may
not generalize to smaller, privately held companies or non-U.S.
firms. As with most empirical research, we rely on proxies to
estimate some constructs of interest. Our proxy for ethical
corporate citizenship is inclusion on Corporate Responsibility
(formerly Business Ethics) magazine’s “100 Best Corporate
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Citizens.” Future research may consider replicating our analysis
using an alternative proxy for ethical corporate citizenship.
Another limitation is our human capital proxy. Consistent with
prior research (Muñoz-Bullón 2010), we suggest CEO tenure is a
reasonable proxy for some aspects of human capital (e.g.,
experience and expertise). However, we recognize that CEO
tenure is not rich enough to encapsulate many other aspects of
human capital, such as education, leadership ability, and
reputation. In addition, future research may explore whether
women pursue top management positions at ethical firms because
these firms have reduced the gender gap in executive
compensation.
Our results suggest the relation between compensation and
ethical corporate citizenship depends on compensation structure.
Although we use a different and larger dataset, our results are
generally consistent with Mahoney and Thorne (2006); however,
we extend this study by using a larger sample of US (rather than
Canadian) firms and examining additional compensation measures
(i.e., stock grants and long-term incentive plan payments).
Building an ethical corporate environment is a long-term
commitment; therefore, CEOs who receive long-term
compensation are more likely to make that commitment.
Consistent with agency theory, our regression results indicate that
ethical corporate citizenship is associated with higher CEO stock
grants and larger long-term incentive plan payments, two of our
three proxies for long-term compensation; however, we find no
difference in CEO option grants, our third long-term compensation
proxy, between ethical and other companies. Conversely, salaries
and bonuses are short-term compensation measures and therefore
do not motivate long-term initiatives, such as fostering ethical
business practices. As expected, we find that CEO salaries are
lower for ethical companies; however, we find no difference in
CEO bonuses between ethical and other companies.
Regarding gender, our regression results are consistent with
extant prior research. We find that even the highest executives,
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CEOs, are not immune to pay disparity due to gender. Even after
controlling for other factors associated with CEO compensation,
we find that female CEOs earn less total compensation, less shortterm compensation, less stock-grant compensation, and lower longterm incentive plan payments than their male counterparts, unless
they work for an ethical company. Our regression results indicate
that female CEOs of ethical companies do not earn less than their
male counterparts in any compensation category we examined. In
answer to our research question, it appears that ethical firms do
bridge the gender gap in CEO compensation.
REFERENCES
Adams, S. M., A. Gupta, D.M. Haughton, and J.D. Leeth. 2007.
Gender Differences in CEO Compensation: Evidence from
the USA. Women in Management Review 22 (3): 208-224.
Albrecht D., and F. Richardson. 1990. Income smoothing by
economy sector. Journal of Business, Finance and
Accounting 17: 713-730.
American Association of University Women. 2012. American
Association of University Women, Website:
http://www.aauw.org/ (Accessed May, 2012).
Anderson, D.J., M. Binder, and K. Krause. 2002. The Motherhood
Wage Penalty: Which Mothers Pay it and Why? The
American Economic Review 92(2): 354-358.
Becker, G.S. 1971. The Economics of Discrimination. 2nd edition.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Bernardi, R.A., S.M. Bosco, and V.L. Columb. 2009. Does
Female Representation on Boards of Directors Associate
with the 'Most Ethical Companies' List? Corporate
Reputation Review 12 (3): 270-280.
Bell, L.A. 2005. Women-Led Firms and the Gender Gap in Top
Executive Jobs. IZA Discussion Paper No. 1689. Available
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=773964.

Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 15, No. 2 (2014)

293

Bertrand, M., and K.F. Hallock. 2001. The Gender Gap in Top
Corporate Jobs. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 55
(1): 3-21.
Blazovich, J.L., and L.M. Smith. 2011. Ethical Corporate
Citizenship: Does it Pay? Research on Professional
Responsibility and Ethics in Accounting 15: 127-163.
Blau, F., and L. Kahn. 1997. Swimming Upstream: Trends in the
Gender Wage Differential in the 1980s. Journal of Labor
Economics 15 (1): 1-42.
Bowlin, W.F., and C.J. Renner. 2008. Assessing Gender and TopManagement-Team Pay in the S&P Mid-Cap and SmallCap Companies using Data Envelopment Analysis.
European Journal of Operational Research 185: 430-437.
Brammer, S., C. Brooks, and S. Pavelin. 2009. The Stock
Performance of America’s 100 Best Corporate Citizens.
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 49: 10651080.
Brooks, L.J. 1997. Business Ethics in Canada: Distinctiveness and
Directions. Journal of Business Ethics 16: 591-604.
Budig, M.J., and M.J. Hodges. 2010. Differences in Disadvantage
– Variation in the Motherhood Penalty across White
Women’s Earnings Distribution. American Sociological
Review 75(5): 705-728.
Bugeja, M., Z. Matolcsy, and H. Spiropoulos. 2011. The
Association between Gender-diverse Compensation
Committees, CEO Compensation and Firm Performance.
Working Paper. Available at
http://www.business.uq.edu.au.
Business Ethics: 100 Best Corporate Citizens of 2000 [2001, 2002,
2003], Business Ethics. Retrieved from:
http://www.business-ethics.com/100best.htm on
02/16/2004.
Business Ethics: 100 Best Corporate Citizens of 2004 [2005, 2006,
2007], Business Ethics. Retrieved from:

294

Blazovich et al.: Do Ethical Firms Bridge The Gender Gap?

http://www.business-ethics.com/100best.htm in January,
2010.
Cai, Y., H. Jo, and C. Pan. 2011. Vice or Virtue? The Impact of
Corporate Social Responsibility on Executive
Compensation. Journal of Business Ethics 104: 159-173.
Callan, S.J., and J.M. Thomas. 2011. Executive Compensation,
Corporate Social Responsibility, and Corporate Financial
Performance: A Multi-Equation Framework. Corporate
Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 18:
332-351.
Chen, J., and T. Wang. 2010. Glass Ceiling Effects: The Case of
Taiwanese Top Executives. Economics Bulletin 30 (2):
1261-1270.
Core, J., R. Holthausen, and D. Larcker. 1999. Corporate
Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and
Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51:
371-406.
Corporate Responsibility: 100 Best Corporate Citizens of 2008
[2009, 2010, 2011], Corporate Responsibility. Retrieved
from: http://www.thecro.com/content/100-best-corporatecitizens in February 2012.
Correll, S.J., S. Bernard, and I. Paik. 2007. Getting a Job: Is There
a Motherhood Penalty? American Journal of Sociology
112(5): 1297-1339.
Elkinawy, S., and M. Stater. 2011. Gender Differences in
Executive Compensation: Variation with Board Gender
Composition and Time. Journal of Economics and Business
63: 23-45.
Fafatas, S.A., and S.A. Hoover. 2012. Ethical Reputations and
Earnings Quality: Recent Evidence from the ‘100 Best’
Corporate Citizens. Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public
Policy 13 (1): 41-70.

Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 15, No. 2 (2014)

295

Farrell, W. 2005. Why Men Earn More: The Startling Truth
Behind the Pay Gap – and What Women Can Do About It.
American Management Association.
Filbeck, G., R. Gorman, and X. Zhao. 2009. The “Best Corporate
Citizens”: Are They Good for Their Shareholders? The
Financial Review 44: 239-262.
Fluke, S. quotation retrieved from:
http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/17/opinion/fluke-equal-payfor-women/index.html. April 2012.
Freeman, R.E. 1984. Strategic Management: A stakeholder
approach. Boston, MA: Pitman.
Foster, B.P., S. Lonial, and T. Shastri. 2011. Mentoring, Career
Plateau Tendencies, Turnover Intentions and Implications
for Narrowing Pay and Position Gaps due to Gender -Structural Equations Modeling. Journal of Applied
Business Research 27 (6): 71-84.
Glass, J. 2004. Blessing or Curse? Work-Family Policies and
Mother’s Wage Growth over Time. Work and Occupations
31(3): 367-394.
GlobeScan. 2006. Most Important Thing a Company can do to be
seen as Socially Responsible. At
www.globescan.com/rf_csr_definition_01.htm, referenced
through Maxfield, 2007.
Gough, M., and M. Noonan. 2013. A Review of the Motherhood
Wage Penalty in the United States. Sociology Compass
7(4): 328-342.
Gray, S.R., and P.G. Benson. 2003. Determinants of Executive
compensation in Small Business Development Centers.
Nonprofit Management and Leadership 13(3): 213-227.
Grosser, K. 2009. Corporate Social Responsibility and Gender
Equality: Women as Stakeholders and the European Union
Sustainability Strategy. Business Ethics: A European
Review 18 (3): 290-307.

296

Blazovich et al.: Do Ethical Firms Bridge The Gender Gap?

Grosser, K., and J. Moon. 2005. Gender Mainstreaming and
Corporate Social Responsibility: Reporting Workplace
Issues. Journal of Business Ethics 62: 327-340.
———. 2005. The Role of Corporate Social Responsibility in
Gender Mainstreaming. International Feminist Journal of
Politics 7 (4): 532-554.
Heckman, J.J., and S. Polachek. 1974. Empirical Evidence on the
Functional Form of the Earnings-Schooling Relationship.
Journal of the American Statistical Association 69 (346):
350-354.
Huang, S.X., R. Pereira, and M.H. Zhang. 2011. Appropriable
Asset Structure and Optimal CEO Compensation. Working
Paper.
Institute for Women’s Policy Research. 2012. Institute for
Women’s Policy Research, Website: http://www.iwpr.org/
(Accessed May, 2012)
Jenson, M.C., and W.H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership
Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360.
Kalist, D.E. 2008. Does Motherhood Affect Productivity, Relative
Performance, and Earnings? Journal of Labor Research
29(3): 219-235.
Laksmana, I., and Y. Yang. 2009. Corporate Citizenship and
Earnings Attributes. Advances in Accounting 25: 40-48.
Ledbetter, L. quotation retrieved from:
http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/24/opinion/ledbetter- equalpay/index.html?hpt=hp_c2. April 2012.
Lundberg, S., and E. Rose. 2000. Parenthood and the Earnings of
Married Men and Women. Labour Economics 7(6): 689710.
Mahoney, L.S., and L. Thorne. 2005. Corporate Social
Responsibility and Long-Term Compensation: Evidence
from Canada. Journal of Business Ethics 57: 241-253.
Mahoney, L.S., and L. Thorne. 2006. An Examination of the
Structure of Executive Compensation and Corporate Social

Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 15, No. 2 (2014)

297

Responsibility: A Canadian Investigation. Journal of
Business Ethics 69: 149-162.
Maxfield, S. 2007. Linking Business's Gender and Diversity
Practices with Corporate Citizenship: Implications for Latin
America. Academia, Revista Latinoamericana De
Administración 38: 65-80.
Mendenhall, W., and T. Sincich. 2003. A Second Course in
Statistics: Regression Analysis, 6th edition, (379-386). New
Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc.
Michelson S., J. Jordan-Wagner, and C. Wootton. 1995. A Market
Based Analysis of Income Smoothing. Journal of Business
Finance and Accounting 22: 1179-1193.
Minnick, K., and T. Noga. 2010. Do Corporate Governance
Characteristics Influence Tax Management? Journal of
Corporate Finance 16 (5): 703-718.
Minton B.A., and C. Schrand. 1999. The Impact of Cash Flow
Volatility on Discretionary Investment and the Costs of
Debt and Equity Financing. Journal of Financial
Economics 54: 423-460.
Muñoz-Bullón, F. 2010. Gender-Compensation Differences among
High-Level Executives in the United States. Industrial
Relations 49 (3): 346-370.
National Committee on Pay Equity. 2012. National Committee on
Pay Equity, Website: http://www.pay-equity.org/ (Accessed
May, 2012).
Ngo, H., S. Foley, A. Wong, and R. Loi. 2003. Who Gets More of
the Pie? Predictors of Perceived Gender Inequity at Work.
Journal of Business Ethics 45: 227-241.
Nichols, D., and C. Subramaniam. 2001. Executive Compensation:
Excessive or Equitable? Journal of Business Ethics 29:
339-351.
Obama, B. 2012. Quotation retrieved from The Jane Dough,
Website: http://www.thejanedough.com/obama-womenand-economy-video/ (April, 2012).

298

Blazovich et al.: Do Ethical Firms Bridge The Gender Gap?

Paul, S.L., and H. Sahni. 2009. Women in Top Management and
Job Self Selection. Working Paper. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1444259.
Roman, R., S. Hayibor, and B. Agle. 1999. The Relationship
between Social and Financial.
Performance – Repainting a Portrait. Business and Society 39 (1):
109-125.
Smith, C., and R. Watts. 1992. The Investment Opportunity Set
and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation
Policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32: 263-292.
Smith, N., V. Smith, and M. Verne. 2011. The Gender Pay Gap in
Top Corporate Jobs in Denmark - Glass Ceilings, Sticky
Floors or both? International Journal of Manpower 32 (2):
156-177.
Thompson, L.J. 2008. Gender Equity and Corporate Social
Responsibility in a Post-Feminist Era. Business Ethics 17
(1): 87-106.
Waddock, S., and S. Graves. 1997. The Corporate Social
Performance – Financial Performance Link. Strategic
Management Journal 18(4): 303-319.
Waldfogel, J. 1998. Understanding the “Family Gap” in Pay for
Women with Children. Journal of Economic Perspectives
12(1): 137-156.
White House Forum on Women and the Economy, 2012.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/04/06/white-houseforum-women-and-economy.
Zweigenhaft, R.L., R. Zweigenhaft, and G.W. Domhoff. 2011. The
New CEOs: Women, African American, Latino, and Asian
American Leaders of Fortune 500 Companies. Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

